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Abstract 
This paper argues that social exclusion robs people of their "confidence" and this loss 
adversely affects their capacity to function effectively.  We may not be able to define 
confidence precisely but we know it when we have it and also when we lack it. In a 
“just” society, no group should unfairly suffer from a “confidence deficit” or enjoy a 
“confidence surplus”.  However, affirmative action policies to boost a deprived 
group's employment rate suffer from several defects. In particular, they may have 
only a small effect (as with Dalits in India) when the group's educational base is low.  
Consequently, another prong of policy could, indeed should, focus on improving the 
educational standards of Dalits.  The root of the problem of poor Dalit achievement 
lies in the many dysfunctional primary and secondary schools in the villages and 
towns of India.  Admittedly, tackling the problem at its roots will only yield results 
after a long delay.  Nor does the emphasis on effective learning at school carry the 
glamour associated with being a putative graduate of the Indian Institute of 
Technology, the Indian Institute of Management, or the All-India Medical Institute.  
But, before the vast mass of educationally and economically deprived children in 
India (many of whom are Dalits) can meaningfully enter the portals of Universities 
and Institutes of Higher Education they need to go to good schools. 
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 1.  Social Exclusion and Deprivation  
 The term "social exclusion" - meaning the process by which certain groups are 
unable to fully participate in the life of their communities and the consequences 
thereof - has, from its origins in the writings of René Lenoir (1974), spawned a vast 
and eclectic literature as the list of things that people might be excluded from has, like 
Topsy, just "growed". Silver (1995), for example, itemises some of these: inter alia 
livelihood; secure, permanent employment; earnings; property; credit; land; housing; 
education, skills, and cultural capital; the welfare state.  The basis on which people 
are excluded also comprises a long list (see DFID, 2005): age, caste, gender, 
disability, ethnic background, HIV status, migrant status, religion, sexual orientation. 
Such an uncontrolled proliferation of items has invited the inevitable criticism from 
some experts in poverty and development epitomised by Oysen's (1997) dismissal of 
social integration/exclusion as "an umbrella concept for which there is limited 
theoretical underpinning". 
 More recently, Sen (2000) attempted to inject some rigour into the concept of 
social exclusion. He began by observing that, in the tradition initiated by Aristotle, 
and continued by Adam Smith (1776), poverty should properly be viewed in terms of 
"poor living" rather than simply "low income".  From the former perspective, poverty 
is a multi-dimensional concept, embracing: low income; bad, or no, employment; 
illiteracy or, at best, low levels of education; poor health and access to healthcare, and 
most generally, difficulty experienced in taking part in the life of the community.1  
 Against this backdrop of a multi-dimensional view of poverty, Sen (2000) 
argued that the function of the concept of social exclusion was not to widen or 
otherwise alter our concept of poverty but, rather, to highlight the relational aspects 
                                                 
1 Or, as Adam Smith put it, "an inability to appear in public without shame". 
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 and processes which underpin poverty.  Thus, some of the critical issues that need to 
be addressed before judgement can be passed on the usefulness of social exclusion as 
a concept are the following:  (i) Does it contribute to our understanding of the nature 
and causes of poverty? (ii) Would our understanding be different if this concept did 
not exist? (iii) Does it enrich thinking about policies to alleviate poverty?  
 In answering this set of questions, Sen (2000) drew attention to two features of 
social exclusion.  The first is that exclusion is a relational concept referring to the 
lack of affinity between an individual and the wider community.  Second, in defining 
the relation between social exclusion and poverty there is a fundamental distinction to 
be made between exclusion being constitutively a part of deprivation and being 
instrumental in causing deprivation. In the "constitutive" interpretation, exclusion 
from some (or all) aspects of social functioning in itself, and of itself, constitutes an 
important aspect of deprivation. In the "instrumental" interpretation, exclusion per se 
does not constitute deprivation but it is a cause of deprivation. 
 Some types of exclusion may be a constitutive part of deprivation but not 
necessarily instrumental in causing deprivation. For example, the denial of access to 
the village well to some families would not have consequences for them with respect 
to water supply if these families had mains water supplied to their homes; however, 
being denied access itself might constitute deprivation by robbing such families of a 
sense of "belonging" to the village.2 Conversely, other types of exclusion may not be 
a constitutive part of deprivation but, nevertheless, might be instrumental in causing 
deprivation: a denial of credit might not be shameful per se but might lead to 
deprivation through an inability to pursue business opportunities.  More generally, 
                                                 
2 In another example, with the social status attached to being an owner-occupier in the UK and the 
USA, a lack of access to the mortgage market might involve enforced living in rented accommodation 
and thus a "feeling of shame"; however, if the quality of owned and rented accommodation was not 
very different no further deprivation (in terms of low quality housing) would follow. 
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 social exclusion might have both constitutive and instrumental importance for 
deprivation.   
2.  Social Exclusion and Confidence 
 So should social exclusion be regarded as constituting deprivation even if it is 
not instrumental in causing (or exacerbating) deprivation?  This paper argues that it 
does: exclusion robs people of their "confidence" and this loss adversely affects their 
capacity to function effectively.  Akerlof and Schiller (2008) define confidence as 
implying behaviour that goes beyond the rational; it implies behaviour based on 
“trust”: in good times we trust that things will turn out well; in bad times, we lose that 
trust. The recession that affects several countries today stems from a lack of 
confidence: banks have lost the confidence to lend to each other, to companies, and to 
consumers. The result is a credit crunch which has caused the economic machine to 
seize up.  
 The same confidence that affects the world economy and causes it to boom or 
bust also affects the behaviour and actions of people.  Two persons may value an 
investment opportunity (say, higher education) differently: the confident person takes 
an optimistic view of his future income stream and invests; the less confident person 
takes a pessimistic view and does not invest.  The Solow (1956) growth model viewed 
output growth as dependent on: labour growth; investment; and innovation. His 
central message was that long-term output growth depended upon innovation. In the 
absence of innovation, diminishing returns would ultimately reduce growth to zero.  
 In a similar vein, one can think of a person’s achievement as depending on his: 
effort; ability; and confidence.  So, given a level of effort and ability, higher levels of 
confidence will be associated with higher levels of achievement. Furthermore, one 
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 can think of a confidence-achievement spiral: increased confidence lead to greater 
achievement and greater achievement also leads to increased confidence. 3  
A Confidence Multiplier 
 Keynes’ great contribution to macroeconomics was the theory of the 
multiplier: an initial increase in income would cause a multiple increase in national 
income, the process being a transmission of income from one person to another with 
consumption as the instrument of transmission. Similarly, one can propose a 
confidence multiplier. This relates to the transmission of increased confidence from a 
small number of persons in a group to a considerably larger number in the group. So, 
if there is an initial increase in confidence of one unit, the overall increase in 
confidence is k≥1.    
 The strength of the multiplier depends on the marginal transmission rate 
(MTR). The MTR, which is the proportion of the initial increase in confidence that is 
passed on to others, will depend on two factors: (i) the degree of interaction between 
group members; and (ii) The starting level of confidence of the group. When 
confidence within a group is very high, the MTR will be low: most of the initial 
increase in confidence will be “saved” with very little being passed on. In the limit, 
when confidence has reached saturation point, nothing will be transmitted and k=1.  
Similarly, if there is little or no interaction between members of the group - or the 
group consists of non-interacting subgroups - the MTR will be low. Conversely, when 
confidence within a group is very low, the MTR will be high.. Suppose there are K 
groups in society, with confidence levels: C1,,,
                                                
….,CK .  Suppose that A=f(C) is the 
achievement function where f(C) is concave (Fig. 1, below).  If social achievement, 
W is the sum of group achievements: W = f(C1)+f(C2)+…+f(CK) , then social 
 
3 Needless to say, the process can also work in reverse. 
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 achievement (W) is maximised when every group has the same level of confidence: 
C1=C2=…=CK. 
3. Discriminatory Bias: Equal Opportunities, and Affirmative Action 
 There are two sources of discriminatory bias in hiring decisions. First, as 
Becker argues, a taste for discrimination makes a bigot willing to expend a cost (or 
forgo a benefit) to associate with his preferred group. As applied to labour markets, a 
bigoted employer will not employ workers from the disfavoured group even though 
they are of similar quality to workers from the preferred group; alternatively, he will 
assign desirable jobs to the preferred group leaving the disfavoured group to perform 
more onerous tasks.  In contrast, statistical or belief-based discrimination can arise 
when the characteristics of an individual’s group are used to evaluate his or her 
personal characteristics: the employer will not employ workers from the disfavoured 
group because he believes that, compared to the preferred group, they are inferior 
workers (Phelps, 1972).        
  Needless to say the two concepts are not independent: "taste based" 
discrimination discourages members of the disfavoured group from improving their 
employability qualities and paves the way for statistical discrimination. So, even after 
taste based discrimination may have been rendered illegal, discrimination based on 
exogenously held beliefs lingers. In practice, the two sources are often conflated as 
encapsulated by the phrase “he/she will fit in better with our company/organisational 
culture”. 
 If candidates from certain groups face discriminatory bias in hiring, then this 
will erode their confidence in two ways. First, they would lose confidence in 
themselves and their ability to interact with society and this, on the argument made 
earlier, would erode their capacity to make the best of their existing abilities.  Second, 
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 in terms of their future development, they would lose the confidence to acquire 
further education and skills. In this section we develop the role of two different sets of 
policies - Equal Opportunities (EO) and Affirmative Action (AA) - in reducing 
discriminatory bias in hiring.    
 A candidate has an underlying, unobservable “quality”, denoted by θ. The 
greater the value of θ, the “better” the candidate. The candidate sends out a signal, s, 
where s is a N-component vector: s=(s1….sN) and s is used to obtain an estimate of θ: 
θ*=g(s).  The quality of θ* as an estimate of θ will depend upon the correlation 
between θ* and θ. In turn, this correlation will depend upon the components of the 
vector s. The presence of “irrelevant” components will corrupt the overall signal and 
weaken the correlation between θ* and θ.  However, the presence of “irrelevant” 
signal components is not a matter of chance: it reflects discriminatory bias. For 
example, questions like: What is your father’s profession? Do you expect to have 
more children? Who will look after your children while you are at work?  all reflect a 
bias against particular groups of persons.  
 A major role of EO policies is to weed out such irrelevant and/or 
discriminatory components by making it illegal to ask such questions. The entire 
signal-extraction process is tightly regulated, made transparent, and placed in the 
public domain. There is a tightly specified procedure for recruitment, from 
advertisement to interview to appointment with a written record maintained at each 
stage. Unsuccessful candidates have the right to appeal against “unfair treatment”. 
Not only do EO policies attempt to eliminate discriminatory bias by making it illegal, 
EO builds non-discriminatory policies into the fabric of the human resource 
management of organisations by carrying out audits of organisations about their EO 
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 outcomes. But, it needs to be emphasised:  EO is not affirmative action because it 
does not impose quotas or require preferential treatment. 
 In contrast to EO, AA is concerned with outcomes, not processes. So, 
organisations are asked to “explain” if their employment proportions of “protected” 
groups differ significantly from the population proportions. In the absence of a 
convincing explanation, the difference is presumed to be due to bias.  For example, 
under the US Civil Rights Act of 1991, any employment practice having a “disparate 
impact” upon women or minorities is unlawful unless it is predicated by “business 
necessity”.  The most common way of escaping sanctions under this Act is by having 
informal quotas in hiring.4 
 The argument in favour of AA is that if there was pre-legislative bias in hiring, 
then, prior to legislation, groups discriminated against would lack the incentive to 
acquire skills. So, AA, by removing this bias, gives these groups the incentive to skill 
themselves. Furthermore, AA policies give protected groups a foot on the bottom rung 
of the ladder. The confidence that this instils creates incentives to acquire the skills to 
climb the rest of the ladder unaided. 
4. Discriminatory Bias in Labour Markets in India 
 Around 18 percent of India’s population are Dalits and they are persons whom 
“caste Hindus”, i.e. Hindus within the four-varna caste system, regard as being 
outside the caste system. The most practical manifestation of this is the social stigma 
associated with being a Dalit: in many instances Dalits are those with whom physical 
contact is regarded by caste Hindus as "unclean".  Muslims in India are also seen as 
"outsiders" but in terms of being "appeased" - by being allowed to maintain their 
                                                 
4 Of course, one can also escape sanctions by showing "business necessity" or by showing an absence 
of "disparate effect", the latter most usually by appealing to the skills distribution of the relevant 
groups. 
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 personal law while Hindus have had to surrender theirs - by being "anti-national" and, 
indeed, of harbouring, abetting and, even being, "terrorists" (Shariff, 2006).   
 However, a major difference between Muslims and Dalits is protection under 
affirmative action: in order to foreshorten the effects of centuries of suppression, 
Dalits are protected under the Indian constitution by affirmative action policies 
("reservation" policies) in public sector jobs and educational institutions and 
representation on elected bodies; Muslims, on the other hand, do not enjoy any such 
protection.5  
 A striking feature of employment patterns in India is the preponderance of 
Hindus in regular salaried or wage employment, Muslims in self employment, and 
Dalits in casual wage labour.  The National Sample Survey (NSS) for 1999-2000 
shows that of men aged between 25-45 years (i.e. prime age men): 32 percent of 
"forward caste" Hindus (that is, non-SC/ST/OBC Hindus - hereafter simply "Hindus") 
compared to 18 percent of Muslims and Dalits, were in regular employment; at the 
other extreme, 47 percent of Dalits, compared to 24 percent of Muslims and 10 
percent of Hindus, worked as casual labourers.  Nearly half of prime-age Muslim 
men, compared to 28 percent of Dalits, and 40 percent of Hindus, were self employed.  
It should be remembered that the Constitution of India allows for special provisions 
for Dalits in terms of reserving a certain proportion of government jobs for them.  
Notwithstanding these provisions, which have been in force for half a century, less 
than one in five Dalit men aged between 25-44 years was in regular employment. 
 Issues of employment cannot be separated from concerns about employability, 
particular those aspects of employability which are related to educational 
qualifications. The inter-group differences in employment patterns in India, noted 
                                                 
5 The Scheduled Tribes of India - the Adivasis or original inhabitants - are also protected by affirmative 
action; affirmative action for Adivasis was intended to assist groups who were traditionally isolated 
from the modern world and from mainstream society. 
 8
 earlier, are reflected in the educational achievements of the three groups.  The NSS 
data show that in 1999-2000, over 90 percent of prime-age Hindu men over the age of 
seven years were literate, compared to 67 percent of Muslims and 67 percent of 
Dalits.6  At the other end of the scale, 24 percent of prime-age Hindu men, compared 
to 6 percent of Muslims and 4 percent of Dalits, were graduates.  Jeffery and Jeffery 
(1997) argued that many Muslims regarded their relative economic weakness as 
stemming from discriminatory practices in job-hiring. The belief that their children 
would not get jobs then led Muslim parents to devalue the importance of education. 
 Differences in educational achievement between Hindus, Muslims, and Dalits 
could be ascribed to differences between the proportions of children from these 
groups enrolled in school.  The National Council of Economic Research (NCAER), 
on the basis of a 1994 Survey, showed that enrolment rates of children between the 
ages of 6-14 were: 84 and 68 percent for (forward caste plus OBC) Hindu boys and 
girls; 68 and 57 percent for Muslim boys and girls; and 70 and 55 percent for Dalit 
boys and girls. In terms of reasons for non-enrolment, 23 percent of Muslim parents 
(compared to 16 percent of (forward caste plus OBC) Hindus and 17 percent of 
Dalits) thought that education was not important while 34 percent of Dalit parents 
(compared to 29 percent of Muslims and 22 percent of (forward caste plus OBC) 
Hindus) faced financial constraints and/or wanted their child engaged in non-school 
activity.   
 A recent analysis of school enrolment rates in India (Borooah and Iyer, 2005) 
argued that sending children to school depended upon attitudes to education of: (i) the 
children; (ii) their parents; and (iii) of the communities to which they belonged.  
These attitudinal differences between the communities were sharpest when the parents 
                                                 
6 The advantage in literacy had a gender dimension: 63 percent of Hindu females above the age of 
seven were literate, compared to 56 percent of Muslim, and 41 percent of Dalit, females. 
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 were illiterate but they tended to narrow substantially, if not disappear altogether, 
when literate parents, regardless of their religious community, appreciated the value 
of education.  
 Can we explain these outcomes in terms of the relational concept of social 
exclusion?  Sen (2000) draws a distinction between active and passive exclusion.  
When exclusion is brought about through deliberate policy it is active and it is passive 
when it is an unintended consequence of social processes. So, for example, the 
deliberate exclusion of Dalits and Muslims from good employment represents active 
exclusion while their exclusion from jobs which need better educational qualifications 
than they posses represents passive exclusion.7 
 It is important to understand the foundations of such active exclusion or, as it 
is more commonly termed, "discrimination".   
 Thorat (2009) details many of the ways through which Dalits are 
discriminated against.  In the context of the rural labour market, discrimination takes 
the form of denial of work as agricultural workers (36 percent of villages practiced 
this), no touching while paying wages (37 percent of villages), lower wages for the 
same work (25 percent of villages), not employed in house building (29 percent of 
villages); denial of access to irrigation facilities (33 percent of villages); and denial of 
access to grazing/fishing grounds (21 percent of villages).   
 The evidence of poor Muslim representation in key areas of public service is 
also strong: for example, the proportion of Muslims in government service in India is 
only about 2% today (Engineer 2002). In 1998, there were 620 candidates selected for 
the top civil service jobs in the country; only 13 of these were Muslims, of whom 6 
                                                 
7 Though their current passive exclusion might be the outcome of past active exclusion from education 
and jobs. 
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 came from one institution, the Aligarh Muslim University (as reported in Islamic 
Voice, 1998). 
 The above observations beg the question of the sources of Dalit and Muslim 
"employment deprivation": how much of this is due to discrimination (through Dalits 
and Muslims being actively excluded from the labour market)? How much of this is 
due to employability (through Dalits and Muslims being passively excluded from the 
labour market by virtue of low levels of human capital)?  These questions give rise to 
another set of related queries: How much have Dalits benefited from reservation 
policies? How much would Muslims benefit if they too were protected by such 
policies?  
 Jobs reservation cannot alter the employment-related attributes of Dalits but, 
given those attributes, it can raise the proportion of persons from these groups who 
secured good employment. An analysis of prime-aged men (Borooah et. al. 2007) 
showed that jobs reservation raised the proportion of Dalits in regular employment by 
about 5 percentage points: that is, in the absence of reservation - which Dalits have 
always enjoyed - the proportion of prime-aged male Dalits in regular employment 
would have fallen from its observed 18 percent to 13 percent.  So, jobs reservation 
contributed less than one-third to the low proportion of regularly employed Dalits.  
The same analysis also argued that when job reservation was extended it should have 
been to Muslims rather than to the OBC since the former faced much greater 
discriminatory bias than the latter.  These findings highlight seven flaws in 
affirmative action policies: 
1. They are limited in their effectiveness when their universe of application is 
constrained: jobs reservation in India for Dalits is restricted to the public 
sector and does not extend to the private sector.   
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 2. The effectiveness of jobs reservation is limited when the educational base of 
the beneficiaries is low.   
3. Jobs reservation for one group (Dalits) triggers demands for reservation 
extension to other groups (OBC) and, in this competition, the winners are not 
necessarily the most deserving of protection. 
4.  There is the creamy layer problem: the benefits from jobs reservation (and 
reservations in educational institutions, particularly medical and engineering 
colleges) may be captured by those subgroups among the intended 
beneficiaries who are already quite advantaged and who use their position to 
effect this capture.   
5. The system could establish perverse incentives: if jobs are available with 
minimal qualifications then it will be minimal qualifications that set a ceiling 
to one's ambitions.  
6. Jobs reservation ensures getting a job; it does not ensure career progression.  
Consequently, candidates from disadvantaged groups, who enter jobs with 
poor qualifications, will stagnate at the bottom of the career structure with the 
potential of triggering a fresh set of resentments and demands. 
7. There will always be the lingering suspicion that those who obtain jobs 
through reservation would not have got them in open competition: they will, 
in consequence, be stigmatised as being unworthy of the position they hold.  
5. Conclusions 
 In the face of these problems that vitiate jobs reservation it would be foolish to 
see them as the sole policy instrument for fighting employment deprivation.  Such 
policies place little emphasis on improving the job-related attributes of Dalits.  Given 
the gulf in educational standards between Hindus and Dalits another prong of policy 
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 could, indeed should, focus on improving the educational standards of Dalits.  This 
needs to be more than reserving places in Management, Engineering, and Medical 
schools.  
 As this paper has emphasised, confidence in oneself, through one's interaction 
with the social environment, is central to achievement. We may not be able to define 
confidence precisely, but we know it when we have it and also when we lack it. In a 
“just” society, no group should unfairly suffer from a “confidence deficit” or enjoy a 
“confidence surplus”.  The root of the problem of poor Dalit achievements lies in the 
many dysfunctional primary and secondary schools, in the villages and towns of 
India, characterised by an absence of learning materials, teachers, and, sometimes, 
even classrooms.  It is in these schools that learning is stifled for millions of children. 
Compounding the problem of dysfunctional schools is the poverty of parents, many of 
whom are Dalits, who cannot afford to keep children on at school; indeed, given the 
poor quality of schooling that their children receive, they see no reason for making 
sacrifices for their children’s education. 
 Admittedly, tackling the problem at its roots will only yield results after a long 
delay. Nor does the emphasis on effective learning at school carry the glamour 
associated with being a putative graduate of the Indian Institute of Technology, the 
Indian Institute of Management, or the All-India Medical Institute.  But, before the 
vast mass of educationally and economically deprived children in India (many of 
whom are Dalits) can meaningfully enter the portals of Universities and Institutes of 
Higher Education they need to go to good schools. 
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